If an action is taken and there are no legal sanctions associated with that action, then the action is not a crime. If sanctions are attached, it is a crime. It sounds simplistic, but seems to hold true, and if the existence of a sanction is such an essential and relevant factor, then why aren't juries informed about sentencing ramifications in every criminal action?

In a 2019 opinion, the United States District Court, District of New Mexico, acknowledged that courts are prohibited from informing the jury about the ramifications of sentencing unless the jury's participation in sentencing is required. United States v. Young, 403 F.Supp.3d 1131, 1155 (D.N.M. 2019), citing Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1994) ("as a general matter, jurors are not informed of mandatory minimum or maximum sentences, nor are they instructed regarding probation, parole, or the sentencing range accompanying a lesser included offense"). Nevertheless, the Young court concluded that withholding sentencing information from jurors is contrary to the intent of the Framers and those who ratified the Sixth Amendment, stating:

The courts' practice today is inconsistent with the jury trial right as the Framers understood that right, because withholding knowledge about the sentencing ramifications of a jury verdict from contemporary juries leaves jurors without knowledge that, at the Framer's time, would have been important in reaching the verdict.

Id. Of course, bound by precedent, the Young court was forced to deny Defendant Apache Young's motion to inform the jury about the consequences of a guilty verdict. In hopeful tones, however, the Young court pointed toward possible change on the horizon evidenced by the U.S. Supreme Court's fairly-recent consideration of the intent and understanding of the Framers in analyzing the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Because Colorado courts routinely rely on both Shannon and Blakely, the analysis in Young seems equally applicable to Colorado courts.

The justification given for withholding sentencing information from jurors was that such information "invites [jurors] to ponder matters that are not within their province, distracts them from their factfinding responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion." Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579. However, the court's analysis in Young demonstrates that knowledge of sentencing ramifications was entirely within the province of the jury at the time the Sixth Amendment was ratified. Furthermore, it is likely that modern juries would also consider the consequences of a potential guilty verdict to be highly relevant information in connection with the charges being deliberated. The Framers fought to protect the rights reserved to the jury in the Sixth Amendment, and openly feared "that the jury right could be lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion." Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 247-48 (1999). There is nothing to indicate that, during the period between the ratification of the Bill of Rights (December 15, 1791) and today, the citizens of this country determined that jurors were no longer entitled to such sentencing information. This power reserved to the jury in 1791, should properly be within the province of the jury today.

In addition to the contention that sentencing information is outside the province of the jury, the Shannon court asserted that sentencing information would prove distracting and confusing to jurors. If this justification means that the convoluted interplay between the criminal sentencing statutes is too complex for the average juror to understand, then isn't that fact also a problem? Shouldn't the laws applicable to the people in our country, and the consequences of breaking those laws, be comprehensible to the average person? If, instead, the reluctance to inform jurors about sentencing ramifications stems from a desire to shield citizens from the realities of the excessive and egregious sentencing outcomes often mandated by the application of our network of complicated sentencing statutes, then that seems a lot like Jack Nicholson's testimony in A Few Good Men - that we "can't handle the truth." Jurors can handle, and undoubtedly deserve, the truth.

Clearly, the practice of informing jurors about the consequences of a guilty verdict would be time-consuming and arguably inefficient. Appreciating that our judicial system is already overburdened, Constitutional requirements might feel like bothersome rocks in our wheels, slowing our progress by making us check unnecessary boxes. However, it is important to remember that "the Constitution is not about efficiently convicting defendants." Young, 403 F.Supp.3d at 1163. "[L]et it be again remembered, that delays, and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters." Jones, 526 U.S. at 246, quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 372 (1769) at 342-344.

There is loud and regular debate about what the Constitution does or does not protect - the right to purchase guns without regulation, the right to terminate a pregnancy, the right to refuse a vaccine. We wrap a tight fist around certain rights, but perhaps we do not grasp tightly enough those Constitutional provisions that we do not perceive as directly, or immediately, impacting our interests. Those protections are susceptible to falling from a loose grip, and being unintentionally left behind.

It boils down to the concept of reciprocity, a philosophical ideal whose roots run deep throughout our Constitution. A dialogue included in The Analects of Confucius asks:

'Is there any single word that could guide one's entire life?' The master said: 'Should it not be reciprocity? What you do not wish for yourself, do not do to others.'

Analects, 15.24. In Leys, 1997. Let's treat defendants like we would like to be treated if we stood accused of a crime, and let's give jurors the information we would want to know if we held the fate of an accused in our hands. Having unjustifiably ignored the steady build-up of this legislation, it is shocking to absorb the tsunami of mandatory sentencing statutes which now exists. Juries, at least, need to be informed about the consequences of their verdicts.